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Labor Law
By DavidS. Bogen

A

large proportion of the opinions
of the Supreme Court during
the past two terms have involved the
employment relationship. This statistic suggests that the Supreme
Court is eager to interpret federal
labor law and is encouraging litigation. Analysis, however, demonstrates that the suggestion is one
more example of the adage that statistics lie. Almost half the cases involve employment discrimination
where the general tenor of Court de-
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cisions is to increase the difficulties of
plaintiff's suits. In the more traditional area of labor relations, the
plethora of opinions reveal great
deference to the National Labor
Relations Board which in turn should
discourage appeals from Board orders
and reduce the conflicts between the
Board and the Circuit Courts. Thus,
the Court's decisions should result in
keeping business out of the federal
courts.
LABOR DECISIONS IN
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
It is only fitting that the foundations for this analysis should be laid
by the construction unions. In the
past few years they have suffered a
number of legislative and judicial setbacks. For many years the construction unions have criticized the
Supreme Court's decision in Denver
Building 1 where the Court found it
was an unfair labor practice for a
union to picket a general contractor
to protest his use of a non-union sub~
contractor. In 1975 they sought to
overturn that decision by legislation
(HR5900), but the legislation was
vetoed by President Ford. In 1977
their democratic friends in Congress
double-crossed them and failed to
pass the bill. Now the Supreme Court
in two decisions has undercut construction union expectations in
another area. In the Pipefittersz case the
Court adopted the board's "right of
control" standard. It held that unions
committed an unfair labor practice
by striking to force an employer to
honor its contractual agreement not
to use pre-finished products where
the use of pre-finished products was
mandated by someone other than
that employer. The dissent argued
that the union was only trying to
force the subcontractor to abide by its
agreement with the union and would
be satisfied if the subcontractor entirely terminated work even if the
general contractor hired another subcontractor who would use prefinished goods on that job. Justice
White for the majority saw that an
object of the refusal to work was to
force the general contractor to retract its requirement that prefinished goods be used. Thus the refusal to work for the subcontractor
Was done with an eye for its effect on
the general contractor. The legality of
the collective bargaining agreement
Provision did not insulate the strike to
enforce it from the strictures of
section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act.

Although the Court's analysis
seemed to make the general contractor the primary employer, the
spectre of Denver Bldg. must haunt
construction unions if they attempt
to picket the general contractor to
force it to cease doing business with
firms making pre-finished goods. The
impact of picketing the general contractor to compel it to allow all piping
to be done on site is not to preserve
work for the general contractor's
employees but for the employees of
independent subcontractors. Denver
Bldg. suggests that picketing is secondary where an object is not the
working conditions of the picketed
employer's employees but the relationship of that employer with
another employer. Indeed, allowing
such picketing leads to the anomoly
of employees of the subcontractor
picketing the general contractor at
the job site and refusing to cross their
own picket line so that the refusal to
work prohibited in Pipefitters is protected under the proviso to 8(b)(4)
permitting employees to honor a lawful picket line. Even stranger would
be the spectacle of a general contractor establishing separate gates so that
unionized employees of the subcontractor would enter the job while
picketing it at another entrance. The
Board specifically left open the issue
of whether the general contractor or
the manufacturer of the prefabricated material were primary employers. The Chamber of Commerce
amicus brief argued that a primary
employer would exist only where
right of control coincided with a bargaining relationship.
The possibility that no primary employer exists influenced the D.C.
court of appeals in the decision which
was overturned by the Court. If the
Court eventually finds that picketing the general contractor to preserve work for employees of a subcontractor is also secondary, it will
have sharply restricted the application of the work preservation exception to 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).
Meanwhile Justice White was so
entranced by the notion that a strike
to enforce a lawful collective bargaining agreement provision might
be an unfair labor practice that this
term he did it again to the construction industry. In the Iron Workers case,3
he wrote the majority opinion which
held that picketing to enforce a lawful prehire agreement with a general
contractor was a violation of section
8(b)(7) if the union did not secure a

majority in the eventual work force
hired by the general.
Although Brennan and Marshall
had led the dissenters in the Pipefitters
case, their concern to protect the individual worker from being forced to
live under a union contract despite
majority non-union sentiment led
them into White's camp in Iron
Workers. This time it was Justices
Blackmun and Stevens who joined
with Stewart in dissent to argue that
picketing to enforce an agreement
permitted by §8(f) was not picketing
for organizational or recognitional
purpose.
Justice White minimizes the impact of the prohibition on picketing
to enforce 8(f) agreements by noting
that voluntary observance of such
agreements is "the normal course
of events"; but with increasing
numbers of open shop construction
firms striving to avoid the inefficiency of jurisdictional work rules,
the decision here, as in Pipefitters, may
encourage the trend against
unionization.
Unions suffered another setback
in the Writers Guild4 case. The guild
attempted to discipline its members
who crossed a picket line in order to
perform their regular supervisory
duties. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Board's decision that the guild had
violated section 8(b)(1)(B) in that such
discipline restrained or coerced the
employer "in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment
of grievances." The dissent of Justice
Stewart joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens argued that
labor unions should be able to enforce their members' agreement to
honor a picket line where the union
does not attempt to dictate how its
supervisor members perform their
duties when the duties are performed. The dissenters point out that
an employer can protect itself by preventing supervisory employees from
joining the union. The majority,
while acknowledging union power to
discipline supervisory members who
cross the picket line to perform rank
and file work, affirmed the Board's
decision that it was an unfair labor
practice to discipline employees for
performing their supervisory duties
during the strike.
Unions have not always lost
recently. Two cases this past term resulted in support for union claims of
organizational rights. In Eastex Corporations, the employer prohibited disMaryland Bar Journal/Fall78/23

tribution of a union newslettP.r that gave notice to terminate. A few days
encouraged members to write their after the contract terminated, Nolde
legislators to oppose incorporation of hoisted the Union by its own petardthe state "right to work" statute into closing the plant and claiming that
the state constitution and urged since the contract had expired, it was
workers to register to vote so they no longer under any duty to pay sevcould work to defeat President Nixon erance pay. The union screamed that
who had vetoed a bill to increase the the right to severance pay accrued
minimum wage. The employer ar- during the term of the agreement and
gued that these portions of the news- thus applied whenever an employee
letter did not deal with the relation- was terminated thereafter. It then
ship between the employer and its sued for severance pay asking that
employees so it was not protected the arbitrator interpret the contract.
activity under section 7 of the Act. The contract did not specifically state
The Supreme Court, however, up- whether the arbitration provision
held the Board's determination that survived for questions of interpretathe newsletter was protected be- tion involving events occurring after
cause it was for "mutual aid and the termination of the contract.
protection" even though it did not Justice Burger, citing the many cases
involve action directed against the beginning with the Warrior and GulfB
employer. Since the employer failed which favored arbitration upheld the
to show any harm to its managerial Court of Appeals' order to arbitrate
interests in the distribution of the the dispute.
Stewart and Rehnquist dissented,
newsletter, the attempt to suppress it
was an impermissible interference pointing out that the basic reasons
with employee's Section 7 rights. behind the presumption of arbiJustices Burger and Rehnquist dis- trability did not exist here. With the
sented, arguing that employer prop- termination of the contract, the
erty rights should give way only union was no longer under any obliwhere necessary to protect rights of gation to forego a strike. In this conself-organization and collective bar- text arbitration did not serve as the
gaining which were not involved in quid pro quo for giving up the right to
this case. The majority, however, strike. Further, arbitration would not
found that the Act protected at- prevent disruption of the business
tempts to improve the position of because there was no longer a conworkers through channels outside tinuing business relationship. Thus
the immediate employer-employee the dissenters found no agreement to
arbitrate the issue of post contract
relationship.
The union was victorious again in severence pay.
One reason underlying arbitration
Beth Israel Hospital6 where the Board
ordered the hospital to·permit solici- to resolve disputes did apply here and
tation and distribution of union it provides a common theme with the
materials in the hospital cafeteria. Pipefitters, Iron Workers, Writers Guild,
The Supreme Court affirmed this Eastex, and Beth Israel cases. Ever since
order, pointing out that most of the the Court held that federal law
patrons of the cafeteria were em- governed contract interpretation in
ployees and that the hospital failed to §301 cases, it has been anxious to
produce any evidence that distribu- avoid the flood of cases in the federal
tion in the cafeteria was harmful to courts that such a holding would
patient care.
seem to engender. Instead it has
The unions also had some success thrust the burden on the arbitrators
in the 197 6 term of the Court. In Nolde and avoided any serious review of
Brothers, 7 the Court upheld a Court of their decisions. Consequently, even
Appeals' order compelling arbitra- while taking a large number of labor
tion of a dispute which arose after the cases these past terms, the message of
contract had been terminated. Nolde the Court has been that the federal
Brothers had a collective bargaining courts will not be a helpful forum. In
agreement with a union represent- Nolde the dispute is referred to
ing its employees which provided, arbitration, while in all the other
inter alia, for severance pay and for ar- cases previously discussed, the
bitration. The contract provided that Supreme Court indicated that the cirafter its expiration date the terms cuit courts should defer to the Board's
would remain in effect until either determination.
Deference to the Board was the
party gave seven days' notice to terminate. After bargaining unsuccess- keynote of a unanimous court in upfully for a new agreement, the union holding the Board's determination in
24/Maryland Bar Journal/Fall78

Bayside Enterprises 9 that truckers delivering feed from a mill to farmers
were not agricultural workers for
purposes of exemption under the
act. Deference to the administrative
agency was also apparent under the
LMRDA. In Steelworkers Local 3489, the
Court's invalidation of union office
eligibility criteria which prevented
over 95% of the membership from
running for office leaned on the special role of the Secretary of Labor in
administration of the act. 10 Indeed, in
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. this term, the
Court even supported the National
Labor Relations Board's refusal to
give copies of statements of potential
witnesses to an employer charged
with an unfair labor practice.n The
Court held that the Board satisfied
its burden of showing that such disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceeding and therefore
it was exempted from the Freedom of
Information Act.
Although the Supreme Court's
deference to federal administrative
agencies should diminish litigation in
federal courts, the Court was willing
to let the state courts take on more
business. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood, 12 a unanimous Court held that
state law on intentional infliction of
emotional distress even during a
labor dispute is not preempted by the
NLRA. Justice Powell refused to review the delicate preemption adjustments of prior cases, but reversed a
Court of Appeals decision which held
that federal labor law preempted such
state law. He noted that state law did
not turn on the existence of a labor
dispute and that the intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
protected by labor law. Nevertheless
he did note that a threat to act either
in a manner protected by the act
or forbidden by the act would be
preempted and cited Linnl3 for the
proposition that the infliction of
emotional distress must be for "outrageous" conduct and that normally
robust language in labor disputes
would not be covered.
No preemption was also the message of two cases this past term. In
White Motor Company, 14 the Court
found that feder<!l labor law did not
preempt state regulation of pension
plans, although the Court held in a
subsequent case that the same state
pension regulation as applied to pension plans established prior to the
date of the statute was invalid under
the contract clause of the constitution.ls

Finally, in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San
Diego Co. Dis!. Council of Carpenters, 16 the
Court held that federal labor law did
not preempt state trespass laws
despite arguments that the trespassory conduct was either prohibited or protected by the National
Labor Relations Act. The Court
pointed out that the state trespass
law focused on the location of the
activity, while the federal prohibitions did not. The more significant
preemption problem was posed by the
possibility that trespassory picketing
could be protected by section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act. The
Court noted that the employer has no
relief under federal law for trespass
by union organizers, so preemption
of state court jurisdiction would
permit an unprotected infringement
of his property rights to go unremedied. On the other hand, unions
could secure adequate protection of
their rights by invoking the Board
processes against an employer who
violates the Act. "Because the assertion of state jurisdiction in cases of
this kind does not create a significant
risk of prohibition of protected conduct, we are unwilling to presume
that Congress intended ... to deprive the California courts of
jurisdiction."
Accommodation to the state was a
theme of the last traditional case to
be discussed: Walsh v. Schlecht.l7 The
Court affirmed a state court decision
requiring ·a general contractor to
make contribution on behalf of employees of subcontractors to various
funds in which a union not representing those employees was a
trustee. The LMRA prohibits payments by an employer to a union
except under specific conditions in
which the union is a trustee and represents the beneficiaries. Although
the contract was to be construed
pursuant to federal law, Justice
Brennan found that the appropriat·e
way to construe the contract was to
avoid statutory violation. Thus he
approved the Oregon courts' construction which found the general
contractor obligated to contribute to
funds measured by hours subcontractor's employees worked although the funds were not available
to such employees.
In sum, the Court's decisions in the
traditional labor law area over the
Past two terms have demonstrated
great deference to federal administrative agencies and to state law. If
this hint is taken by the circuit courts,

the result should reduce the cases
brought in the federal courts.
PUBLIC SECTOR
Two recent decisions involved the
relationship between the Government and the public sector union. The
appearance of such cases on the
Supreme Court level reflects increasing organization and activity by
public sector unions at local governmental levels. Indeed, the cases may
be more important as symbols of the
growing importance of public sector
unionism than for what they held.
The first, City of Madison v. Wis. Emp.
Rei. Com'nrs was not difficult for the
Court to decide. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission had
found that a school board committed
an unfair labor practice by permitting a teacher to speak against an
agency shop proposal at a public
meeting. Justice Burger for the Court
noted that merely presenting views at
a public meeting was not negotiation. Negotiation may properly be
limited to private sessions between
the government management and
union. However, singling out employees of government and excluding them from the speech rights
afforded all other citizens at an open
meeting violates the First Amendment. Brennan, Marshall and Stewart all concurred. Stewart emphasized the lack of a legitimate state
interest in prohibiting the teacher's
speech under these circumstances
while Brennan and Marshall focused
on the implications of discrimination
in a public forum.
While the Court had no trouble
affirming the right to oppose the
agency shop, it had a little more difficulty with the agency shop itself. In
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education,19
teachers in Detroit sought to invalidate an agency shop provision as an
abridgement of their rights of freedom of speech and association. The
Court held that Hansonzo and Streetzr
applied as a constitutional,matter to
public employment, . so that the
agency shop could be required of all
public employees, but funds collected could not be used to support
ideological causes to which the
teacher was opposed.
Insofar as the service charge is used
to finance expenditures by the union
for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment" wrote Justice
Stewart, the agency shop is valid. But,
he continued, contributions may not

be compelled for "ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining." At this point, where a line might
be drawn to disentangle public sector
bargaining and union political activity, Justice Stewart draws instead attention to the problems of drawing a
line.
The process of establishing a written collective bargaining agreement prescribing
terms and conditions of public employment may require not merely concord at the
bargaining table, but subsequent approval by other public authorities; related
budgetary and appropriations decisions
might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining process.
He then refuses to draw a line in this
case because the specific activities
have not been spelled out-thus suggesting that the problem of agency
shop will reappear in the court.
Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun have no difficulty drawing that
line-they would find the agency
shop in the public sector a violation of
the First Amendment in that the existence of the union bargaining is inherently political. Thus the agency
shop means that government, not a
private employer, is forcing persons
to pay money to support ideas which
they oppose. If the dissent had prevailed, the case might have significantly affected both public sector
union growth and possibly raised
questions about agency shop in the
private sector. The majority, however, maintains the status quo and
postpones for another day the tough
questions of drawing lines in the
public sector.
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
By far the largest group of cases
involving the employment relationship both this term and last are those
involving the laws against discrimination. Here again, as in the traditional cases, a theme of discouraging
cases in federal court exists. Unlike
the traditional cases, however, in the
civil rights area, resort to federal
courts is discouraged by substantive
or procedural decisions rather than
deference to administrative or state
bodies.
While Stewart seemed a lonely dissenter in many traditional cases, he
has become the spokesman for the
court in most of the civil rights cases.
In Dothard v. Rawlinsonzz he reaffirmed the application of Griggsz3 in
Title VII cases to permit a prima facie
case to be made aut by showing a
continued on page 3 5
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neutral employment practice had a
disproportionate racial or sexual
effect. In Rawlinson a height and
weight requirement for correctional
officers had a disproportionate impact on women and no attempt was
made to justify it. Indeed, three
justices concurred on grounds
that while such requirements could
be justified by showing a need for the
"appearance of strength," the prison
system made no such argument.
Lest plaintiff's counsel be carried
away, Stewart's decision in Hazelwood
v. U.S.Z 4 made it clear that the use of
statistics to demonstrate a prima facie
case would be carefully scrutinized.
The relevant statistics are not just a
comparison of the work force to the
available pool of workers, but the
work force hired after the Act became applicable (in Hazelwood, the
1972 extension to governmental
units). Further, the remand contained directions to make a careful
review of factors to determine the appropriate applicable pool of workers.
Defendants' ability to rebut a prima
facie case was enhanced in Furnco.zs
The Court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit that plaintiffs had made a
prima facie showing of discrimination by proving they had done everything within their power to apply for
employment and that they were
qualified. The Court, however, noted
that the prima facie case raises the inference that the job denial was based
on race. Consequently, proof of the
racial composition of the work force
can be used to rebut the inference of
improper intent.
Defense counsel in civil rights
actions could even find comfort in
Stewart's opinion in Rawlinson. He upheld the refusal to employ women in
contact correctional positions (75% of
the jobs) as a bona fide occupational
qualification, saying that guards of
the opposite sex would lead to a
greater likelihood of violence. Marshall and Brennan dissented on the
grounds that proof of such greater
likelihood was wholly inadequate and
based on sex stereotyping. Further,
"to deprive women of job opportunities because of threatened behavior of
convicted criminals is to turn social
priorities upside down."
The greater latitude in justifying
employer action was reflected in TWA
v. Hardison 26 in which the Court over
another dissent by Brennan and
Marshall held that to require an em-

ployer to bear more than a de minimus
cost to accommodate an. employee's
religious beliefs would be an "undue
hardship."
Plaintiffs in Title VII suits had even
worse news in the Teamsters27 case
which overturned the fairly consistent determinations of lower
courts. The Court held that a departmental seniority system which was
racially neutral except for its effect to
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination in
assigning to departments was insulated by section 703(h) of Title VIII so
that seniority expectations of existing employees should not be disturbed. While approving the Frankszs
determination that failure to apply
for a job did not bar individuals from
a compensatory fictional seniority
remedy, Justice Stewart said that the
burden was on the plaintiffs to prove
they would have applied but for the
discrimination and that a showing
that the employee was in the less remunerative department and that the
policy of discrimination was well
known was insufficient to discharge
the burden.
The integrity of the seniority
system was the keynote of another
decision of the 1976 term. In United
Air Lines v. Evans, 29 Justice Stevens
wrote that where an individual's
claim for unlawful discharge was time
barred, it should have no impact on an
attack on the seniority. system. Consequently, failure to grant seniority
for the previous employment was still
protected by 703(h).
The time bar became a more likely
occurrence as a result of the Court's ·
decision in Robbins & Meyers3o which
stated that attempts to pursue a discharge through the grievance procedure would not toll the time limits
for filing with EEOC.
Title VII plaintiffs' attorneys may
also be concerned with the East Texas
Motor Freigh/31 case which found that
the district court appropriately failed
to find a class action where the named
plaintiffs would not have been eligible
for the jobs in which discrimination
was alleged.
A final discouraging note for plaintiff suits is found this term in
Christianburg Garmenf32 where the
Court said it was appropriate to
award defendant attorney fees for
frivolous or unreasonable Title VII
suits even if the plaintiff acted in subjective good faith.
·
The net effect of these cases is to
make recovery in civil rights suits less
likely for individual plaintiffs beMaryland Bar Journai/Fall78/35

cause the Court will scrutinize more
closely evidence of discrimination to
make a prima facie case, and will uphold employers' justifications in such
suits more readily than the lower
courts.
The scene then shifts to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission where Stewart's opinion in Occidental Life33 states that the EEOC is not
barred by the time limits for individual suits when it files suit for pattern
or practice violations. Even the state
statutes of limitation are inapplicable. Thus, the time barred individual can still hope that the EEOC will
take her situation as part of a pattern
or practice and obtain for her fictional seniority and back pay which
she could not get by her own suit
under Title VII.
The plaintiff is more and more
likely to be a female. The struggle for
recognition of a proper role for
women in the labor marketplace is
proceeding on many fronts simultaneously. The major substantive
problem for the Court has been the
treatment of pregnancy. In General
Electric v. Gilbert,34 the Court applied
the standards of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Title VII in holding
that Geduldig v. Aiello3s controlled, and
it was lawful for an employer to exclude pregnancy and its complications from compensable disabilities.
The Court noted again that "there is
no risk from which women are protected and men are not." The dissenters Brennan and Marshall took
issue with this point, noting that
prostatectomies, vasectomies and circumC1sJOn are sex specific and
covered. However, these sex specific
procedures do have feminine
counterparts in hysterectomies, tubal
ligation and other operations on the
female reproductive system. There is
simply no male counterpart for pregnancy.
"The determinative question," in
the words of Justice Brennan's dissent "must be whether the social policies and aims to be furthered by Title
VII and filtered through the phrase to
'discriminate' contained in §703(a)(I)
fairly forbid an ultimate pattern of
coverage that insured all risks except
a commonplace one that is applicable
to women but not to men." The
majority viewed this question as a
conundrum in which an employer is
damned if he does and damned if he
doesn't, for coverage would give
women a benefit not afforded men.
Their reply is to allow either choice so
36/Maryland Bar Journal/Fall78

long as the choice itself is not shown
to be rooted in a desire to disadvantage a particular sex.
The Court may have been influenced by three factors which they do
not mention. First, the impact of the
denial of disability benefits commonly
falls not on the woman alone but on
the whole family-husband and
wife-whose combined income is
diminished by the decision to bear a
child. Second, while most workers
will return to the job as soon as their
disability ceases, a substantial number of women may choose to remain
home to care for an infant so that the
pregnancy is a prelude to termination of employment and reluctance to
return to work may make computation of the period of actual disability
difficult. Third, the nature of disability coverage for pregnancy means
that all workers, male and female
alike, must share in the costs of some
women's decision to raise a family.
While this may be good social policy, it
is not a clear policy of Title VII.
Perhaps the most important factor
in the Court's decision in Gilbert was
uncovered this term in Nashville Gas v.
Satty.36 The Court reaffirmed its position in Gilbert that exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage was
lawful absent a motive to discriminate against members of one sex, but
held that denial of accumulated competitive seniority to women returning from pregnancy leave when it was
not denied to others returning from
sick leave was a violation of Title VII.
The Court emphasized that the denial
of competitive seniority here deprived women of employment opportunities because of their sex.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion draws a
distinction between benefits and
burdens. He said that denial of disability pay was merely a refusal to
extend a benefit to one class which
would not be applicable to the other
class. He then argued that the denial
of competitive seniority was a burden
which was imposed on one sex.
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out
the manipulation involved in this
characterization. "The grant of seniority is a benefit which is not shared
by the burdened class [of women not
allowed to retain seniority after
leave]; conversely, the denial of sick
pay is a burden which the benefited
class need not bear." He finds the distinction "in terms of whether the employer has a policy which adversely
effects a woman beyond the term of
her pregnancy leave." He gives no

justification for this distinction, for as
his dissent in Gilbert indicates, he disagrees with it. The grounds, however, may be found in the perceived
social policy of Title VII reflected in
§703(a)(2) to prevent deprivation of
employment opportunities because of
sex.
The act on its face indicates no clear
policy on payments to one sex for a
sex related cause, but it is designed to
provide an equal opportunity to work
regardless of sex. If a man wishes. to
raise a family, his job will be unaffected, but unless a woman retains
her seniority, t~e decision to bear a
child may foreclose her from work.
When, as in Satty, the employer does
not show a significant adverse effect
to his business as a result of retaining seniority, the Court finds a
violation.
While the emphasis in Satty was on
lost employment opportunities, the
Court also dealt with differences in
benefit payments last term. In Los
Angeles v. Manhart,37 the Court held
that a pension plan which required
women to contribute more than men
violated the Title VII prohibition
against discrimination with respect to
compensation because of such individual's sex. The city argued that different levels of contribution were not
discriminatory because women have
a longer life expectancy. The Court
responded that "individual risks, like
individual performance, may not be
predicted by resort to classifications
proscribed by Title VII."
The Court distinguished Gilbert by
noting that pregnancy is sex specific
while longevity is not. Only women
become pregnant so pregnancy benefits are given to only one sex (and
their denial is a denial to one sex). On
the other hand, some .,;omen have
short life spans while some men have
long ones. Thus a classification based
on sex will result in all women receiving less take-home pay than men
during their working years while the
amount each individual receives in
pension benefits over his or her life
span· will vary widely depending on
their individual longevity.
The result of the Court's labor decisions in the last two terms should be
a decrease in the traditional labor
decisions in the federal courts and a
diminution in race discrimination
actions. But increasing public sector
labor activity, disputes over the rights
of women and the problems of affirmative action will provide a substantial number of cases to keep the Court

busy in the coming years. 0
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